Return of the Luddites by Niou, Emerson M. S. & Ordeshook, Peter C.
Return of the Luddites Emerson M.S. Niou
and 
Peter C. Ordeshook
In this response to
Stephen Walt’s critique1 of the application of formal analysis to international
security studies, we take strong issue with a number of Walt’s arguments and
assertions, and we try to clarify what we believe are his misconceptions about
the nature and mechanisms of progress in scientiªc research. We begin, how-
ever, by identifying some of the issues we do not dispute with Walt. First, it is
true that formal analysis, especially in the area of security studies, is only
infrequently motivated by the attempt to explain some well-documented em-
pirical regularity or universally recognized empirical anomaly. If there is room
for disagreement here, it is the extent to which regularities or anomalies can
be found in the security studies literature that are sufªciently precise to allow
careful analysis. Second, there is little disagreement that some formalism exists
for its own sake, although we need to be cautious here because much of this
rigor seeks to understand the very deªnition of rationality in complex strategic
environments. Third, despite the proliferation of competing models of deter-
rence, bargaining, coalitions, threats, and so on, those models are rarely set
against each other for competitive empirical assessment. Finally, we cannot
ignore the fact that very little of what researchers label “theory” is theory in
any true sense, but instead is often best described as a demonstration of one’s
ability to cobble together assumptions and derive something that can be
labeled “lemma” or “theorem.”
Rational Choice, Game Theory, or Formalism?
Despite these agreements, we believe that much of Walt’s discussion is wrong-
headed and counterproductive to his objective of sustaining a policy-relevant
subªeld of security studies. To begin, Walt’s article is not a dispassionate
attempt at “evaluating the contribution of recent formal work in the ªeld”
(p. 8); rather, it is an unconstructive critique. But what is it a critique of—
rational choice, game theory, or formalism? His article begins by bemoaning
the limitations and increasing predominance of the rational choice paradigm
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(citing such “experts” as Chalmers Johnson). Then, via a superªcial review of
Bayesian analysis, Walt’s focus detours to game theory, but soon is directed at
three things—the paradigm, game theory, and formalism—after essentially
equating the paradigm with game theory and formalism. This blurred focus is
occasioned, doubtlessly, by the fact that the paradigm, game theory, and for-
malism, though intimately related, are not equivalent: nonmathematical schol-
ars such as V.O. Key certainly embraced rational choice perspectives; William
Riker, arguably the father (or at least midwife) of rational choice thought in
political science, rarely, if ever, proved a theorem and instead relied on the
formal insights of others; and the use of mathematics often falls outside the
domain of what anyone might argue is rational choice theorizing.
Walt’s true target, though, appears to be formalism. He gives only passing
reference to the usual shopworn critiques of the rationalist paradigm (although
he cannot refrain in footnote 35 on page 17 from swallowing the misconception
that the paradigm presupposes people who are mathematical geniuses), and
he seems only mildly discomfited by the folk theorems of game theory, which
place the as yet unmodeled and poorly understood mechanisms of equilibrium
selection at the center of any complete theory of social processes. The reason
for Walt’s redirected focus, we suspect, is that the study of international
relations and security is a subªeld of political science that has long accepted
the rationalist premise of self-interested action and depended, albeit impre-
cisely, on the strategic imperatives of game theory (recall that much of game
theory’s early development was motivated by the inherent inadequacies of
other modes of analysis into strategic matters). Here, of course, we need not
refer only to contemporary scholars, but to our classical predecessors (e.g.,
Taylor, Morgenthau, Claude, etc.). Notions of rationality, self-interest, and
strategy permeate these earlier writings, while debates among their heirs (e.g.,
Waltz, Keohane, Jervis, Gilpin, etc.) are more likely to concern individual
motives, perceptions and beliefs, the role of institutions in constraining indi-
vidual action, and the speciªcation of strategic environments.
Consistency
It would seem, then, that there should be considerable room for agreement
among us. Unfortunately, that room is circumscribed by Walt’s failure to
understand at least ªve aspects of scientiªc study: (1) the value of consistency;
(2) the creativity inherent in a formal model’s development; (3) the necessity
of proceeding with clearly explicated null models; (4) the practical nature of
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assessing the empirical content of a model; and (5) the different ways in which
science advances in other disciplines.
Our difªculties begin with Walt’s discussion of the relative value of logical
consistency and precision. Put simply, Walt stacks the deck against formal
analysis by asserting that originality and empirical validity are more highly
valued than are logical consistency and precision: “Although all . . . are impor-
tant, the latter two criteria—originality and empirical validity—are especially
prized” (p. 13). But while an argument can easily be original if it is incoherent,
illogical, or imprecise, we do not see how any idea, hypothesis, or argument
can be empirically valid if it is any of these things. Punch lines sustained by
obscure or disconnected reasoning may be true, but only accidentally so. And
how do we know they are true if their opposite cannot be refuted because we
do not know what that opposite is owing to vague conceptualizations? To have
content, all arguments must possess domain constraints in the form of initial
assumptions, a deªnition of terms, and evident logical connections, and we
cannot assess empirical validity if, as is the case with much of what is labeled
“theory” in security studies, one or more of these things is nonexistent. To
impose only the criteria of originality and the appearance of empirical validity
establishes a ªeld upon which the rational choice theorist quite properly rejects
playing.
In the same vein, Walt laments that formal essays are difªcult to read,
because doing so requires wading through pages of dense notation and mathe-
matical argument to learn the hidden assumptions and restrictions of the
analysis. This lament, however, is different than Walt’s assertion that “formal
methods . . . make it easier to bury key assumptions within the model, thereby
forcing readers to invest considerable time and effort to unearth the basic logic
of the argument” (p. 20). That assumptions are sometimes less than self-
evident is true. But, and this is the big “but,” it is hardly an established fact
that formalism makes it easier (than what?) to camouºage the logic of an
argument. On the contrary, a careful reading will either uncover all assump-
tions or reveal their absence if the analysis is logically ºawed. Walt may
bemoan his difªculty with discovering or understanding assumptions that are
formally stated, but to assert that they cannot be discovered by those who
make the effort is patently false.
Having opted for the artful values of originality and the appearance of
empirical validity, Walt fails to acknowledge fully that logical consistency,
precision, and the attendant discoverability of assumptions are not uniform
characteristics of much of anything else. If consistency, precision, and discover-
ability did characterize other less formal approaches, formalism and even the
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rational choice paradigm would not have gained the foothold in our discipline
that so concerns Walt. It is silly to deny that a reasoned and informal contem-
plation of events and processes cannot yield insights that often move the focus
of scientiªc investigation. But the rational choice paradigm and formalism are
not mushrooms that sprung up in an unattended intellectual forest. They are
reactions to a discipline mired in imprecision, vagueness, obscure logic, ill-
deªned constructs, nontestable hypotheses, and ad hoc argument. They are a
reaction to a discipline that in the 1920s proclaimed the Weimar constitution
the greatest political-intellectual achievement of its age; a discipline that in the
1960s substituted correlation for cause; a discipline submerged in such conven-
iently vague and ill-deªned ideas as “power,” “leadership,” “authority,”
“group,” “alliance,” “function,” “ideology,” “culture,” “regime,” “stability,”
and “balance.” They are reactions to a discipline that substituted the well-
turned phrase for concrete constructs, operational measures for theoretical
primitives, and the gloss of methodological sophistication for true theory. They
are, in short, a reaction to a discipline that did and does precisely what Walt
critiques the formal analyst of doing—burying key assumptions in an indeci-
pherable format, although generally that format was a language more to the
liking of those who studied French and Plato in college rather than calculus.
As part of his critique of the weight that formal analysts place on consistency
and precision, Walt acknowledges that the limitations of the rationalist para-
digm and game theory “do not discredit the use of formal models.” But he
then attempts to advance the argument that “the potential gains in precision
and logical consistency do not demonstrate the superiority of formal tech-
niques over other approaches” (p. 20). We might agree if we knew the identi-
ties of these other approaches. If Walt’s argument is to be constructive, it is
incumbent that he establish a better treatment of the speciªc difªculties noted
by “other approaches,” for as we are all taught in elementary philosophy of
science courses, we reject a theory only when a better one becomes available.
The questions that immediately come to mind here, of course, are: Is there a
theory of risk that we can substitute for Bayesian analysis? Where in the study
of international relations do we ªnd a more coherent or empirically valid
theory of strategic complexity? What other part of social science treats the
indeterminacies of social processes that game theory’s folk theorems uncover?
Creativity
Perhaps our sharpest disagreement with any speciªc point in Walt’s argument,
however, is his assertion that “technical sophistication and logical consistency
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did not yield particularly creative or original results” (p. 26). Again, this is less
a coherent argument than a simple expression of prejudice, because logical
consistency is itself a profoundly important creative contribution. How many
trees have been cut to publish attempts at explicating Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye’s synthesis of realist and liberal perspectives, Waltz’s alternating
conceptualizations of realism, the true content of neorealism, or, more to the
point of Walt’s substantive interests, the preconditions for a viable deterrent
strategy, the avoidance of trade wars, and stable alliances? The weaving to-
gether of a complex argument that appears to be consistent with some real-
world process is valuable, just as it is useful to secure qualitative insights into
the likely meaning of events and their preconditions. But that is something
different from logical consistency. This is not to say that such consistency is
always absent from verbal or purely statistical examinations of political events
and processes, but it is not their uniform characteristic. It may be true, more-
over, that science often advances without ªrst establishing the logical founda-
tions of an idea, but ultimately, those foundations must be established before
the word “theory” can be uttered with any meaning and the true value of an
insight established. To rank raw conclusions above logical consistency in the
overall scheme of what we demand from ourselves as scientists, as Walt does,
or to judge the construction of a mathematically precise argument that estab-
lishes a sufªcient condition for something to be true as less original than the
addition of a suggestive, yet vague or incomplete conceptual scheme is not a
constructive comparative assessment of alternative intellectual approaches.
The preceding rejoinder, however, gives too much legitimacy to Walt’s cri-
tique. Consider, for example, the issue of the causes of war. Kenneth Waltz, in
Man, the State, and War, offers a puzzle, but not one that he solves. Geoffrey
Blainey, in The Causes of War, helps resolve this puzzle by suggesting that the
problem concerns the extent to which, using the game theorist’s jargon, the
assumption of common knowledge is not satisªed. Finally, Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and David Lalman, in War and Reason—one of Walt’s whipping
boys—dissect Blainey’s hypothesis and begin the search for the conditions
under which incomplete information rather than common knowledge is the
critical parameter in determining the likelihood of conºict. Walt may quibble
about their empirical methods, but this sequence of intellectual developments
is precisely what any scientist would want to see—paradox, hypothesis, and a
logical reªnement that clearly differentiates the alternative possibilities. Be-
cause understanding requires each step in this process, to judge one step more
or less original than the others is nonsense.
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Originality in formal analysis does not reside, moreover, in the mere deriva-
tion of some result. Given that Walt apparently values models and modeling
so little, he cannot see the level of creativity that often goes into a model’s
design. A precise speciªcation of the problem and the attendant assumptions
and constructs do not appear out of thin air. Indeed, the process of model
construction (which is often separate from analysis) is much like the informal
contemplative processes and freewheeling imagination that Walt so admires.
But even this assessment understates the originality of ideas to be found in
formal analysis. Consider again the folk theorems of game theory. At ªrst
glance, those theorems appear to be mere statements of mathematical logic
pertaining to abstract notions of equilibria. Moreover, Walt refers to them as if
they were limitations of game theory. We would suggest, however, that barring
a demonstration of the reliance of those theorems on constructs and assump-
tions that other approaches can avoid while treating the same issues, those
constructs and assumptions are no more limitations of game theory than they
are of any theory. More to the point, however, even if it is true that formal
analysts must appeal to such ideas as culture and norms as a way of reªning
a game-theoretic prediction, we at least have learned the role of such ideas in
speciªc social processes and the theoretical constructs required to study their
genesis and evolution.2 Indeed, it is only the game-theoretic perspective and
its attendant formalism that have brought the problems of indeterminacy,
coordination, and equilibrium selection to light. And as a consequence, they
can now be used to explore such issues as the sources of stability in constitu-
tional design; the possibility that the disagreements over paradigms in inter-
national relations concern only an assessment of the likelihood that one
equilibrium versus another will be feasible; and, in that context, the functions
performed by international organizations, trade, and parallel political struc-
tures. If Walt does not see these contributions as original, then his deªnition
of originality must encompass only the generation of incomplete, atheoretical
insights.3
2. See, for example, David K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
See also the citations in H. Peyton Young, “The Economics of Convention,” Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 105–122.
3. See Russell Hardin, “Why a Constitution?” in Bernard Groffman and David Wittman, eds., The
Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); and Emerson M.S.
Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, “Less Filling, Tastes Great: The Realist-Neoliberal Debate,” World
Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 209–234.
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Null Models
Walt stacks the deck against formalism in another way. Much of his discussion
is framed by the ostensible purpose of “evaluating the contribution of recent
formal work” (p. 8). Any scientiªc assessment, however, requires a clear and
reasoned null hypothesis that is sustained when the evidence fails to support
its alternative. In Walt’s case, that null appears to be a rather imprecise “inquiry
in any other form.” Time and again, he tells us of the profound insights gained
by other approaches that, we presume, are either inherently beyond the reach
or somehow beyond the capacity of formal analysts—profound insights that,
if we are to judge by what formal analysis lacks in Walt’s view, are “well-
veriªed empirical predictions” (p. 6) that have “been tested in a careful and
systematic way” (p. 8). Unfortunately, with the exception of a single footnote
citing a few empirical studies of which he approves (see p. 30 n. 72), we are
at a loss to learn the identities of those systematically tested hypotheses. Walt
cites approvingly Waltz’s inºuential book (p. 17), Theory of International Politics,
but the editions we see are missing the chapters that offer a critical empirical
test of any speciªc hypothesis. Walt’s own The Origins of Alliances is an admi-
rable effort at dissecting the processes whereby alliances form and dissolve—
one we have found useful in our own research—but eighteen tables (of which
nine merely summarize the historical record discussed in the text, four sum-
marize the author’s interpretation of speciªc events, four offer macrodata that
can be gleaned from standard sources, and one offers an ad hoc index of
“capabilities”) hardly qualify as a rigorous empirical test of anything.4 Walt
cites the less formal work of Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg, and Mancur
Olson, although he fails to note the more formal contributions of that age by
Kenneth Arrow and Duncan Black or John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern’s seminal volume, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, upon whose
mathematical shoulders all the above stood (though the shoulders upon which
Olson stood were those of economists who formalized the preconditions for
market failure in the presence of externalities). But with respect to strategic
studies, we are unaware of much that meets Walt’s demand for systematic
testing. Certainly, Walt cannot be referring to the demarcation of ideas among
realists, neorealists, liberals, and neoliberals; to any conclusions pertaining to
the relative importance of domestic politics; or to insights into the operation
of strategic deterrence. And we doubt he is referring to the mainstay “fact”
4. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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that democracies never war among themselves, and the dependence of this
conclusion on ad hoc operationalizations of the concept of democracy and
measures of the severity of conºict.
Walt’s failure to contrast clearly the accomplishments of formal analysis with
“other approaches” is all the more frustrating because it is true that our less
formal intellectual predecessors offer a plethora of valuable insights and ideas
that frame the research most students of international affairs, regardless of
persuasion, pursue. But in most cases, that research takes the form of attempts
to resolve some ambiguity or inconsistency in arguments, for, as we believe
any true comparative assessment would show, those predecessors offer a full
plate of competing, contradictory, imprecise, and incomplete arguments, hy-
potheses, and perspectives. It may be true that much of what the formal analyst
offers as “substantive conclusion” is well understood or at least consistent with
some prior argument (we know colleagues who claim that everything can be
found in Aristotle). But showing that a prior conclusion follows logically from
some set of initial assumptions is a form of reproducibility that science de-
mands—it tells us that the models in question are not mere fantasy and may
not even be fundamentally ºawed. Indeed, such redundancy is a form of
empirical test that Walt demands to the extent that the initial ideas or conjec-
tures arose from empirical observation. But perhaps more important, we learn
something else from the “proof” of an otherwise known conclusion or asser-
tion—we learn the hidden assumptions or incomplete logical connections of
those earlier arguments, the sufªcient conditions for their validity, and, if we
are lucky or sufªciently imaginative, their necessary conditions. Indeed, if
these assumptions and logical connections were not hidden or incomplete, the
prior arguments leading us to them could not have been any less formal than
the essays Walt singles out for criticism.
Testing
The fundamental problem with Walt’s critique, however, is not the prejudices
it reveals or its failure to do what is demanded of the formal analyst—com-
parative empirical assessment. Rather, it lies in Walt’s failure to understand the
methods whereby formal and empirical analyses complement each other in
any real ongoing scientiªc enterprise. Walt requires direct empirical application
and assessment. Yet the researchers he cites approvingly—Schelling and Ol-
son—as well as Riker, for example, apply formalism differently. Schelling’s
seminal contribution, The Strategy of Conºict, is neither strict formalism nor
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strict empiricism, but interpretation. He takes a few formal lessons of game
theory (e.g., the possibility of multiple equilibria and the importance of se-
quencing in a game’s extensive form) and transforms those ideas into useful
applications (to, in the cases cited, the importance of mechanisms of coordi-
nation and the nature of viable threats). Olson nowhere offers a test of the
theorems about market failure in the presence of externalities upon which his
analysis relies (and we are not aware of any prior tests of those theorems in
the literature), but by expanding the domain of those rigorously derived
results, he opens the door to additional theorizing about substantive matters
(e.g., political entrepreneurship and the applied subªeld Elinor Ostrom terms
“common pool resource” issues).5 Riker offers perhaps a clearer example of
sophisticated “application.” Rather than suppose that Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem (an exercise in pure deductive formalism) or McKelvey’s wholly
abstract investigation of the properties of the majority preference relation in
generalized spatial preference structures offer results that require direct testing,
in Liberalism against Populism, Riker uses these ideas to compel a confrontation
between two seminormative paradigms of democratic theory, each with exten-
sive policy-relevant implications.6
Schelling, Olson, and Riker do not propose to test anything directly, but
instead their discussions are skillfully woven and interpreted elements (theo-
rems, structures, and propositions) of formal theory. Walt may lament the small
number of such volumes (just as we all do and just as we all should lament
the limited number of truly seminal and clear presentations of alternative
paradigms in international relations), but we need to understand that the
formal essays Walt critiques for having failed to be either sufªciently original
or for not offering a direct empirical assessment of their conclusions are only
small pieces of a larger puzzle—bricks in an incomplete wall. That the wall is
incomplete, however, is merely a call to use those bricks and replicate the
talents of Schelling, Olson, and Riker. Riker, in fact, knew only the rudiments
of game theory, and barely concerned himself with the proof of such things as
McKelvey’s instability theorem. But rather than decry the impenetrability of
5. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
6. William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and
the Theory of Social Choice (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1982). The essays we cite here as
forming the basis of Riker’s analysis are Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951); and Richard D. McKelvey, “General Conditions for
Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models,” Econometrica, Vol. 47 (1979), pp. 1085–1112.
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that proof (and its reliance on such concepts as continuous and convex prefer-
ence sets, measurable spaces, upper-semicontinuous functions, etc.), or be-
moan the fact that the proof was accompanied by a minimal substantive
assessment of its implications or assumptions, Riker succeeds in reshaping our
thinking about democratic elections and referendums, the potential for major-
ity tyranny in a democracy, and the strategic options of otherwise disadvan-
taged political actors. If Walt complains that he cannot ªnd the development
of equivalent applications in the formal literature of strategic studies, then one
reasonable response is to ask the critic to engage in the interpretive discourse
he believes is essential and valuable and set his ideas before us.
The Process of Scientiªc Development
To comprehend fully our disagreements with Walt, however, it needs to be
understood that the development of formal models and their interaction with
the empirical world often proceed differently than do the methods of inductive
reasoning and “informed opinion.” First, by the interchangeable use of words,
Walt suffers a confusion between “model” and “theory” when he writes as if
they are equivalent. They are not. Theory in our paradigm encompasses a
single entity—game theory and its underlying constructs—whereas the re-
search erected on this structure is best described as modeling. It may be true
that if models are sufªciently “connected” and if they concern a broad enough
range of substantive matters (e.g., microeconomics), then there is little lost in
labeling the package “a theory.” But nothing approaches this packaging in
strategic studies. Of course, a distinction between model and theory does not
by itself detract from Walt’s core critique—that formal analysis lacks a coherent
body of empirically tested or testable propositions. But the distinction does
explain that absence as well as the presence of “testing” that Walt deems
unsatisfactory. Here let us turn to Walt’s discussion of our own work, The
Balance of Power, which he admittedly treats more kindly than even we might
(owing in part to our research subsequent to that effort). Two aspects of our
analysis bother Walt. First, he argues that our “empirical analysis ultimately
relies on ad hoc factors.” Second, he states that “instead of using history to test
the model, the model is used to organize the historical narrative” (p. 44).
Although we fail to see how this differs from what passes as empirical analysis
in strategic studies (or how it differs much from Walt’s own research into
alliances), we nevertheless take these “criticisms” as compliments. To suppose
that a formal model can wholly encompass a complex process that stretches
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over some forty-ªve years without resorting to some ad hoc discussion is
ludicrous. By deªnition, that reality must be orders of magnitude more com-
plex than any model, in which case the question becomes: Can the events and
patterns we perceive as reality and our understanding of it be organized by
anything at all? If a few pages of notation does this in even a modest way—and
if, in particular, we can identify those events and patterns that are not yet
accommodated by a model and gain a sense of what assumptions are not
satisªed in each deviant case—then certainly the analyst has accomplished a
great deal.
More speciªcally, however, it is Walt’s ªrst comment that is the more both-
ersome, for it is here that he reveals his faulty image of empirical scientiªc
research—something akin to researchers scurrying about in white smocks,
conducting critical experiments. In fact, most of science consists of the ill-
deªned and even sometimes random “play” between models, theories, and a
complex reality. Rarely does science consist of deªnitive hypothesis testing,
and then only in very restrictive and controlled environments. The reason for
this is simple: unless we are concerned with some utterly basic scientiªc issue,
reality is far too complicated to be accommodated in any straightforward way
by any simple tractable model. And one implication is that, in general, scientiªc
testing is an imprecise, often informal process. Put simply, productive empiri-
cal research, whether in political science or any other ªeld, proceeds differently
than what Walt demands of the formal analyst.
The study of politics is, as we argue elsewhere, a ªeld more akin to engi-
neering than to science.7 Of necessity, our discipline must deal with phenom-
ena that are both too complex for simple, closed-form analysis and too complex
for the imprecision of other approaches. This, perhaps, is the attractiveness of
imprecision and journalistic discourse—it gives the impression of under-
standing without revealing the inherent inadequacies of our ideas. But in the
natural sciences, we typically learn things about complex systems through an
informal, hands-on, trial-and-error process—a process that is informed not
merely by careful empirical analysis but also by the failure of models to
perform adequately. In trying to solve real-world problems, the natural scien-
tist and engineer often (always?) confront questions they cannot answer theo-
retically, and the “solution” is an ad hoc “ªlling in” of the analysis, sometimes
using “good guesses” and other times particularistic experiments that Walt
7. Peter C. Ordeshook, “Engineering or Science: What Is the Study of Politics?” Critical Review,
Vol. 9, Nos. 1–2 (Winter–Spring 1995), pp. 175–188.
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might term “ad hoc” (e.g., wind tunnels), with the hope that over time and
through experience, this ªlling in will become routinized and even generalized.
The practicality of the problems treated, combined with accountability (on the
part of the researchers themselves) for faulty judgments, imposes a degree of
rigor on this process whereby, as if in some giant bookkeeping enterprise,
anomalies and empirical regularities are collected and stored, awaiting theo-
retical reªnement and generalization.
Absent this practical accountability and implicit bookkeeping, much of what
passes for “theory testing” in political science is, in fact, the search for empirical
regularities that warrant theoretical explanation. But more to the point, this
practical interplay is largely absent in political science, and we do not consis-
tently confront the real world in a way that involves sanctions for erroneous
advice and predictions. Not much is lost to the rest of the world, or even to
the authors themselves, if some argument or conceptual scheme proves worth-
less or wrong, just as not much is lost to anyone if a student of neorealism,
Soviet studies, crisis bargaining, or deterrence theory publishes a volume
replete with ambiguity, misconceptions, misperceptions, illogical inferences, or
just plain dumb advice. In short, political science lacks the feedback among
theory, model, and application that characterizes discovery and empirical as-
sessment in other ªelds, including even economics. But it is here that logical
consistency and rigor gain their greatest advantage for advancing political
science as a substantively useful, policy-relevant discipline. Imprecision,
vagueness, ambiguity, and the like allow researchers to dodge responsibility
behind the shelter of a “reformulation” or “reinterpretation” of their ideas:
“The analysis was not wrong, only poorly applied or interpreted.” This dodge,
however, is far less feasible with rigorous analysis if only because its limitations
and failings are, by virtue of its rigor, more readily apparent. And when failure
occurs, as it inevitably must, the transparency of formalism allows for the
precise cataloging of error, which, of course, is why rigor is valued and why
those who eschew it ªnd it uncomfortable.
Finally, we are puzzled most of all by Walt’s assertion that “formal rational
choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security
debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post–Cold War world; the
character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribu-
tion of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conºict; the future role of
nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conºict)”
(p. 46). Even if we were to agree with this statement, we would add that the
contributions of Walt’s “other approaches” to this list of security issues escape
Return of the Luddites 95
us as well. But the list is revealing, for it is the product of someone concerned
not with science and empirical regularity as those terms need to be understood
for the development of cumulative knowledge, but instead with the commen-
tary and informal discussion we ªnd in newspapers and popular journals that
has too long appeared under the label “political science.” Such discussion and
commentary may be entertaining and even sometimes enlightening, but it
remains mere journalism until it can be given the solid scientiªc grounding
that formal theorists pursue.
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